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REIMBURSEMENT OF INDENTURE TRUSTEES FOR
SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION UNDER SECTION
503 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
INTRODUCTION
An indenture trustee, the person or institution charged with the fiduci-
ary duty of carrying out the terms of an agreement under which bonds or
debentures are issued, participating in a Chapter 9 or 11 case under the
Bankruptcy Code' often plays a significant role in the initiation of the
proceeding,2 as well as in the formulation of, opposition to or confirma-
tion of the debtor's plan of reorganization.' Section 503(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides that the indenture trustee must have made a
"substantial contribution" to the case in order to be reimbursed for serv-
ices and expenses arising out of the bankruptcy.4 Approved applications
for reimbursement of expenses and fees result in an administrative ex-
pense priority that is paid directly from the assets of the bankruptcy es-
tate, thereby decreasing the estate's net value.5
Courts vary in their fundamental approaches to determining whether
an indenture trustee and its counsel have made a substantial contribution
to a reorganization. No comprehensive standard exists by which to mea-
sure a substantial contribution. Consequently, applicants for reimburse-
ment face potentially different results based on similar sets of facts in
different jurisdictions.
To understand Section 503(b)'s "substantial contribution" test, it is
necessary to review both the section's legislative history and decisions by
1. See [Bankruptcy Reform] Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). The Bankruptcy Code of 1978
became effiective for proceedings commenced after October 1, 1979. The Bankruptcy
Code replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and all amendments, including the Chandler
Act of 1938. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
2. See I I U.S.C. § 303(b) (1988), discussing the commencement of involuntary cases
by indenture trustees. Involuntary cases are commenced by filing a petition in a bank-
ruptcy court under either Chapter 7 or Chapter I I of the Bankruptcy Code. See id.
3. The aim of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is to enable enterprises to reor-
ganize into viable businesses. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 404 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 6360. The indenture trustee
becomes involved in this process when the debtor defaults on its obligations. Default
forces the indenture trustee to represent the interests of the debenture holders pursuant to
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77rrr (1988).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (1988). Chapter 9 deals with municipal bankrupt-
cies and will not be addressed in this Note. See I U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
5. "The policy underlying administrative expense priority is that 'the estate as a
whole is benefited if general creditors subordinate their pre-bankruptcy claims in order to
secure goods and services necessary to an orderly and economical administration of the
estate after the petition is filed.'" Christian Life Center Litig. Defense Comm. v. Silva
(In re Christian Life Center), 821 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987)(quoting Yermakov v.
Fitzsimmons (In re Yermakov), 718 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also I I U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(1) (1988) ("[fOirst, administrative expense [priority] allowed under section
503(b)").
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courts interpreting its predecessor statutes. 6 The dynamic between legis-
lative history and case law provides the groundwork for contemporary
decisions concerning reimbursement for services rendered and fees in-
curred. A coherent and thorough substantial contribution test may be
formulated by analogizing to pre-Bankruptcy Code decisions involving
both indenture trustees and other bankruptcy participants and by consid-
ering the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,1 which prescribes the duties of
indenture trustees.
This Note offers guidelines that courts should employ when determin-
ing future questions of substantial contribution. Part I provides a back-
ground from which to view applications for reimbursement. Part II
investigates Section 503's legislative history and discusses the benefit-to-
the-estate test, the foundation for contemporary substantial contribution
determinations. Part III critically evaluates the tests8 that various courts
use to determine entitlement to allowances for both indenture trustees
and other applicants under pre-Bankruptcy Code statutes and under the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978. This Part concludes that no satisfactory ap-
proach exists for evaluating applications for expenses incurred and serv-
ices rendered by indenture trustees in a Bankruptcy Code reorganization.
Drawing heavily on Section 503(b)'s legislative history, its interaction
with the Trust Indenture Act, and analogy to awards to other applicants,
Part IV of this Note proposes uniform guidelines for evaluating applica-
tions by indenture trustees for reimbursement based on the benefit con-
ferred both directly and indirectly on the estate.
I. BACKGROUND
Chapters 9 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code give municipal govern-
ments and businesses in financial trouble the opportunity to reorganize
6. Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is based on the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
and amendments to it, such as the Chandler Act of 1938. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988); 3 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy 503.04, at 50345-48 (15th ed. 1991) [herein-
after Collier].
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988); see supra note 3.
8. Courts have developed various and often contradictory tests to determine whether
an applicant has made a substantial contribution to a bankruptcy proceeding and is there-
fore entitled to compensation. Some of the more widely used tests include the benefit-to-
the-estate test, which was developed under the Chandler Act and will be examined in
Part II, the foster-and-enhance-rather-than-retard-or-interrupt-the-reorganization-pro-
cess test, the actual-direct-and-demonstrable-benefit test, the tangible-benefit test, and the
but-for test all of which are analyzed in Part III. See, e.g., Pierson & Gaylen v. Creel &
Atwood (In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc.), 785 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986)
(quoting In re White Motor Credit Corp., 50 Bankr. 885, 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985))
(foster-and-enhance-rather-than-retard-or-interrupt-the-reorganization-process test); In
re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 Bankr. 246, 252 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (citing
Haskins v. United States (In re Lister), 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988)) (actual-direct-
and-demonstrable-benefit test); In re Ohio Ferro-Alloys Corp., 96 Bankr. 795, 798
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (tangible-benefit test); In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47
Bankr. 557, 566 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (benefit-to-the-estate test).
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themselves as viable concerns. 9 The Bankruptcy Code also seeks to en-
sure that creditors' interests are protected in the reorganization pro-
cess.1" In addition, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939£ protects these
interests by requiring that every qualified indenture 2 impose certain fidu-
ciary duties on the indenture trustee 13 in the event of the issuer's default,
and protect the holders during the subsequent reorganization. 4 Bank-
ruptcy is such a default.
The Bankruptcy Code recognizes the fiduciary duties of the indenture
trustee and incorporates provisions for the reimbursement of indenture
trustees in representing the interests of debt securities holders. Section
503(b)(3)(D) provides for an allowance of administrative expenses to
a creditor, an indenture trustee, an equity security holder, or a commit-
tee representing creditors or equity security holders other than a com-
mittee appointed under section 1102 of this title, in making a
substantial contribution in a case under chapter 9 or 11 of this title.
I
In addition, Section 503(b)(5) provides that
reasonable compensation for services rendered by an indenture trustee
in making a substantial contribution in a case under chapter 9 or I 1 of
this title, [may be granted] based on the time, the nature, the extent,
and the value of such services, and the cost of comparable services
9. See supra note 3.
10. "It seems clear... Congress had the protection of public investors.., primarily
in mind." SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 614 (1965).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77rrr (1988).
12. Indenture was defined by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as "mean[ing] mortgage,
deed of trust, or indenture, under which there is outstanding a security, other than a
voting-trust certificate, constituting a claim against the debtor, a claim secured by a lien
on any of the debtor's property, or an equity security of the debtor." 3 Collier, supra note
6, at 503-51-52 n.99. In order to be qualified, the indenture must contain those provisions
required by §§ 77jjj-77rrr of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. Section 77hii contains crite-
ria assuring the independence of the indenture trustee; § 77kkk relates to certain self-
dealing by the indenture trustee; § 77111 deals with communications among bondholders;
§ 77mmm describes periodic reporting requirements by the indenture obligor, requiring
the indenture obligor to comply with certain formalities in connection with its substantive
contractual commitments under the indenture; § 77nnn mandates certain recording and
certificate requirements; § 77ooo sets forth the indenture trustee's duties and responsibili-
ties; § 77ppp describes certain rights of bondholders; § 77qqq authorizes the indenture
trustee to bring suit against the obligor on behalf of the bondholders for unpaid debt; and
§ 77rrr provides that if any of the indenture's mandatory provisions conflict with another
provision, the mandatory provisions control. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77iii-77rrr (1988).
13. Indenture trustee was defined by § 101 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as the
"trustee under an indenture." 3 Collier, supra note 6, at 503-51-52 n.99. The Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 definition of indenture trustee closely parallels that of the Trust In-
denture Act of 1939. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(10) (1988) (Trust Indenture Act definition).
14. In particular, § 315(c) of the Trust Indenture Act mandates provisions in each
qualified indenture "requiring the indenture trustee to exercise in case of default... such
of the rights and powers vested in it by such indenture, and to use the same degree of care
and skill in their exercise, as a prudent man would exercise or use under the circum-
stances in the conduct of his own affairs." 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (1988).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (1988) (emphasis added).
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other than in a case under this title.1 6
Currently, courts use many tests to ascertain whether an indenture
trustee has conferred the requisite services to satisfy Section 503's sub-
stantial contribution requirement. These tests include the benefit-to-the-
estate test, the significance test, the actual-direct-and-demonstrable-bene-
fit test, the tangible-benefit test, the foster-and-enhance-rather-than-re-
tard-or-interrupt-the-progress-of-reorganization test and the but-for
test. 1 7 The benefit-to-the-estate test finds its basis in the Bankruptcy
Code's predecessors, the Chandler Act of 1938 and the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, and in decisions rendered thereunder."8 The significance test
appears to have been created under the Bankruptcy Code as a threshold
to determine the nature of conduct. 19 Both the actual-direct-and-demon-
strable-benefit test and the tangible-benefit test appear to be refinements
of the basic benefit-to-the-estate test and are also grounded in the Chan-
dler Act.2° The foster-and-enhance-rather-than-retard-or-interrupt-the-
progress-of-reorganization test and the but-for test seem to be judicial
creations less rooted in legislative action.2"
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 503 OF THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BENEFIT-TO-THE-
ESTATE TEST, THE FOUNDATION FOR
CONTEMPORARY "SUBSTANTIAL
CONTRIBUTION" ANALYSIS
The benefit-to-the-estate test is perhaps the most widely used and earli-
est means of analysis developed to determine whether a substantial con-
tribution has been made by an indenture trustee or other applicant, and
consequently whether such a person is entitled to compensation under
Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to enactment of the Bank-
16. Id. at § 503(b)(5) (emphasis added).
17. See supra note 8.
18. See infra notes 78-79, 90-91 and accompanying text. In order to collect compen-
sation, the benefit-to-the-estate test requires conduct that is of a beneficial nature to the
estate, such as discovery of fraud. Confirmation of the debtor's plan of reorganization is
not necessary to establish a benefit. See 3 Collier, supra note 6, at 503-48; In re Russell
Transfer, Inc., 59 Bankr. 871, 872 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986); see also In re Eastern Me.
Elec. Coop., Inc., 121 Bankr. 934, 939 (Bankr. D. Me. 1990) ("services must be 'closely
beneficial' to the estate, but it is no longer the case that compensable services contribute
to a plan that is ultimately confirmed").
19. The significance test resembles the benefit-to-the-estate test, although it is em-
ployed more frequently as an initial inquiry to characterize the category of service ren-
dered. See infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
20. These tests are mutations of the benefit-to-the-estate test; their differences are
based almost exclusively on the terms that courts select to define the type of benefit neces-
sary to satisfy the substantial contribution standard. See infra notes 134-149 and accom-
panying text.
21. Unlike the actual-direct-and-demonstrable-benefit test and the tangible-benefit
test, which faithfully observe § 503's foundations and describe benefits, these tests look to
the overall effect on the reorganization process due to the claimant's actions. See infra
notes 152-162 and accompanying text.
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ruptcy Code in 1978, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and its amendments
governed all bankruptcy cases.' The benefit-to-the-estate test was the
basis for reimbursement decisions under these predecessor statutes.2 Be-
cause Congress sought to maintain continuity between allowance awards
determined under these statutes, in particular the Chandler Act of 1938
and the Bankruptcy Code, 24 pre-Bankruptcy Code benefit-to-the-estate
decisions continue to have a profound impact on modem allowance anal-
yses.25 Many of the same actions, factors and standards are considered
today, albeit under the ambit of different statutory parameters.
A. Legislative History of Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code
The present day benefit-to-the-estate test can be traced to the debate
over the propriety of equity receivership, a pre-1933 procedure whereby
management of a debtor company commenced a bankruptcy proceeding
by filing a creditor's bill in federal court.26 The court had an extremely
limited role in the equity receivership 7 procedure, however. The bank-
ruptcy estate, administered by a reorganization committee, compensated
all participants in the administration of the reorganization for services
22. The Supreme Court has stated that a case commenced under the Bankruptcy Act
continues to be governed by it regardless of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. See
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 129 n. 1(1979). Many courts, however, have undoubtedly
been influenced by the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in their analysis of cases that
arose prior to the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code (October 1, 1979) but that were
decided subsequently. Many of these courts have gone to great lengths to dispel any
perception of influence.
The Fifth Circuit noted in a 1980 case that the Bankruptcy Code, which was "effective
for bankruptcy cases commenced on October 1, 1979, does not apply to this case." Ci-
tibank, N.A. v. Multiponics, Inc. (In re Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 731, 734 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1980). The Tenth Circuit rejected any conclusions drawn from the timing of Con-
gress' adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules and Congress' consideration of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, enacted as the Bankruptcy Code, to its ultimate decision in the case. See
King Resources Co. v. Phoenix Resources Co. (In re King Resources Co.), 651 F.2d
1349, 1353-54 (10th Cir.), cerm denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981).
Another court has acknowledged the influence of the new Bankruptcy Code. This
court found the Bankruptcy Code likely responsible for the allowance of prevailing or
market rates charged to nonbankruptcy matters as reimbursement in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. See In re Pacific Homes, 20 Bankr. 729, 737 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982). Such
rates were forbidden under § 503's predecessors. See id.
23. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
26. See 8 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Study and Investiga-
tion of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganizations
Committees 5-9 (1936-1940) [hereinafter SEC Report].
27. Equity receivership requires "the exercise of administrative jurisdiction, as distin-
guished from decision of controverted or litigated questions." Lincoln Printing Co. v.
Middle West Util. Co., 6 F. Supp. 663, 683 (N.D. I11. 1934), aff'd, 74 F.2d 779 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 295 U.S. 746 (1935). The equitable benefit doctrine provided for compensa-
tion of services that were beneficial to the estate but did not include compensation for
services rendered in resisting a bankruptcy filing. See Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533,
539 (1903).
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rendered and expenses incurred.2" Under equity receivership, the reor-
ganization committee possessed sole discretion to grant allowances.29
In 1933, because of congressional dissatisfaction with equity receiver-
ship as a means of reorganizing corporations, Congress enacted Section
77 as an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.30 Congress hoped
to "put a stop to the wholesale plundering by reorganization managers,
both by way of fees and for commissions covering new securities"' 31 by
placing the reorganization proceedings and plan under the control of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the courts. Section 77, however,
applied only to the reorganization of railroads.32 Furthermore, consum-
mation of the plan was not a condition precedent to the granting of an
allowance pursuant to Section 77(c). 33 This last situation is still the case
under Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.34
Two years later, in 1935, Congress revised Section 77,35 explicitly
granting indenture trustees (1) an allowance for actual and reasonable
expenses incurred, and (2) compensation 36 for services rendered "in con-
nection with the proceeding and plan ' 37 of a railroad reorganization.
Congress' intent to treat indenture trustees differently from other bank-
ruptcy participants is demonstrated by this statutory allowance for
compensation.38
28. The SEC criticized the abuses created by the committee's fee-setting power. See 1
SEC Report, supra note 26, at 647-48.
29. Reorganization committee decisions were subject to review by courts, but courts
were reluctant to interfere with committee decisions. See Teton, Reorganization Revised,
48 Yale L.J. 573, 592-94 (1939).
30. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 1, 47 Stat. 1474 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 205
(1934)) (repealed 1978); see H.R. Rep. No. 1897, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1933).
Equity receivership remained a congressional concern, and Congress continued to seek
to curb the practice. See [I Supp. App.] Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31
and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 679 (1975-1976).
31. H.R. Rep. No. 1897, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1933).
32. Congress was concerned with the "expensive, protracted, confusing, and ineffi-
cient administration of affairs of railroad companies engaged in interstate commerce
.... Id. at 5.
33. See In re New York, Out. and W. Ry., 171 F. Supp. 634, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
see, e.g., In re McGann Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1951) (recognizing interim
allowances); Finn v. Childs Co., 181 F.2d 431, 440 (2d Cir. 1950) (fairness demands
opportunity to make claim).
34. See 3 Collier, supra note 6, 503.03, at 503-49; In re Russell Transfer, Inc., 59
Bankr. 871, 872 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986).
35. Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 205 (Supp. V
1940)) (repealed 1978).
36. This was the first time that a statute explicitly provided indenture trustees with
reimbursement. Unlike committees and other representatives of creditors reimbursed
only for expenses incurred, indenture trustees were entitled to both expenses and compen-
sation. See 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(12) (Supp. V 1940) (repealed 1978).
37. H.R. Rep. No. 1283, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935).
38. Of all participants in the bankruptcy proceeding, indenture trustees were the only
party to be singled out for reimbursement of both expenses and compensation, as opposed
to only expenses incurred. See 11 U.S.C. § 205 (Supp. V 1940) (repealed 1978).
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Congress further expressed its intent to accord indenture trustees
unique treatment when it added Section 77B, which dealt with corporate
reorganizations generally, to Chapter VIII of the Bankruptcy Act in
1934."9 Congress placed allowances for compensation for services ren-
dered and expenses incurred under the supervision and discretion of the
court, as it had done under Section 77, to "reduc[e] the cost of reorganiz-
ing corporations."' Despite the broad language of Section 77B, al-
lowances were made, for the most part, only to dominant interests and
then only for services that led to the confirmation of a plan of reorganiza-
tion.4' In Dickinson Industrial Site, Inc v. Cowan42 and Realty Associ-
ates Securities Corp. v. O'Connor,43  the Supreme Court narrowly
construed Section 77B by strictly limiting compensation to persons able
to demonstrate entitlement under the language of Section 77B." The
Supreme Court further defined those instances in which claimants were
entitled to compensation: compensation was to be granted for "service
rendered to and benefits received by the estate" 45-the foundation of to-
39. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 1, 48 Stat. 912 (codified at I 1 U.S.C. § 207 (1934))
(repealed 1978).
40. S. Rep. No. 482, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
41. See 8 SEC Report, supra note 26, at 245-46; see also Steere v. Baldwin Locomo-
tive Works, 98 F.2d 889, 891 (3d Cir. 1938) (compensation available only for direct and
material contribution leading to successful reorganization); Teton, supra note 29, at 603-
07 (comparing the rationale behind the tendency to award fees only to management mo-
nopolies under Section 77B with the increased participation envisioned by sections 242
and 243 of the Chandler Act).
42. 309 U.S. 382 (1940).
43. 295 U.S. 295 (1935).
44. The Court explained that Congress intended to limit administrative expenses by
enacting § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which restricted reimbursement only to
dominant interests who assisted in the confirmation of a plan. See Dickinson Indus., 309
U.S. at 388-89; Realty Corp., 295 U.S. at 299. But see In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12
F. Supp. 823, 835-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (declining to follow Supreme Court's dictum,
broad interpretation of § 77B justified award to indenture trustees and their attorneys of
fees for services and expenses which were beneficial and not in opposition to plan), aff'd
in part sub nor. Boehm v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (In re Paramount Publix Corp.), 85
F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655 (1937).
After congressional revision of the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court refused to con-
strue the terms of an agreement that set compensation for a bankruptcy referee to include
a percentage of the principle payable on bonds. Instead, the Court limited compensation
to a percentage of cash received by the creditors. This construction saved the estate
approximately $41,000. See Realty Corp., 295 U.S. at 298.
In another situation involving the assets of a bankruptcy estate, the Supreme Court
again narrowly interrupted allowance priorities. See Dickinson Indu-t, 309 U.S. at 389.
In an appeal by a bondholders' committee over a reduced allowance award, the Supreme
Court discussed jurisdictional questions in light of the interaction between § 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act and the Chandler Act. Resolving all statutory ambiguities in favor of a
conservative interpretation of Congressional intent and seeking to prevent excess fees and
administrative expense in corporate reorganizations, the Court denied, as a matter of
right, appeals of allowance awards. See id. This decision effectively limited participation
in reorganization proceedings to dominant groups. See 1-2 Report of the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 257-58 (1973) [hereinafter CBL Report].
45. Dickinson Indus., 309 U.S. at 389 (footnote omitted). The Southern District of
1991]
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day's benefit-to-the-estate test. These Section 77B cases set forth certain
guidelines that courts have used to analyze subsequent cases:46 benefit to
the estate and nonduplication of efforts.
Between 1936 and 1940, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") reported to Congress, 47 questioning the merit of granting reor-
ganization committees near absolute power.48 Dissatisfied with the prior
role of indenture trustees, the SEC proposed that indenture trustees be
given "the obligation to exercise that degree of care and diligence which
the law attaches to such high fiduciary position[s]. ' 49 The SEC recom-
mended that the role of the indenture trustee "be built up, so that an
indenture trustee will be made a more active person."50
According to the SEC, the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of
Section 77B "disfavor[ed]" individual action and "encouraged" group
action.5 Such limited participation ran contrary to congressional in-
New York employed a similar notion of benefit. See Paramount-Publix, 12 F. Supp. at
827.
46. See, e.g., In re Packard Properties, Ltd., 118 Bankr. 61, 63 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1990) (under Bankruptcy Code, expenses must have benefited estate); Sakowitz, Inc. v.
Chase Bank Int'l (In re Sakowitz, Inc.), 110 Bankr. 268, 272 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989)
(duplicative services may be considered in assessing value of services furnished under
Bankruptcy Code); In re W.T. Grant Co., 85 Bankr. 250, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(applicant must have conferred a tangible benefit in order to be compensated under Bank-
ruptcy Code), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States Trust Co. v. Pardo (In re
W.T. Grant), 119 Bankr. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Boston and Me. Corp., 62 Bankr.
199, 203 (D. Mass. 1986) ("measurable and valuable benefit" to entire estate required
under Bankruptcy Act); In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc., 54 Bankr. 504, 510
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (under the Bankruptcy Code, the applicant must actively partici-
pate in nonduplicative manner); In re La France Indus., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 642, 647 (E.D.
Pa. 1942) (duplication of services may not result in a multiplication of awards under
Bankruptcy Act).
47. The SEC filed its report pursuant to its authority under the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1988).
48. The SEC noted "the vice inherent in the situation where the committee is the sole
arbiter of the reasonableness of its fees and the propriety of its expenses." I SEC Report,
supra note 26, at 647; see also In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823, 827
(S.D.N.Y. 1935) (noting the "grave abuses" that occurred prior to the adoption of § 77B
of the Bankruptcy Act), aff'd in part sub nom. Boehm v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (In re
Paramount Publix Corp.), 85 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655 (1937).
The Paramount-Publix court observed that § 77B's language was "sufficiently compre-
hensive to include in the several categories any one having an interest in the reorganiza-
tion, provided the services... [were] proper and beneficial..." 12 F. Supp. at 823. The
court did not, however, offer any parameters by which to assess whether an applicant's
activities were in fact "proper and beneficial."
49. See 8 SEC Report, supra note 26, at 341. Throughout its investigation, the SEC
noted that many indenture trustees failed to take an active role in reorganization proceed-
ings, even though they had the power to do so. See id.
50. 6 J. Moore & L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy 1 2.12, at 327 (14th ed. 1978)
[hereinafter Collier (14th ed. 1978)] (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
134 (1937)).
51. 8 SEC Report, supra note 26, at 252. Such an interpretation limited participation
in bankruptcy proceedings to groups of creditors with sufficient votes to force adoption of
a plan of reorganization and foreclosed the opportunity for individual participation. See
CBL Report, supra note 44, pt. 1, at 257-58.
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tent.2 The SEC recommended that Congress provide reasonable com-
pensation for services rendered and reimbursement for costs and
expenses incurred to parties in interest and their attorneys in connection
with the administration of an estate or with a plan of reorganization. 3
Congress enacted these recommendations into law as part of the Chan-
dler Act,54 which later became the foundation for Section 503(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978." Sections 242 and 243 of the Chandler Act
liberalized the allowance provisions of Section 77B by enlarging the class
eligible for compensation and by expanding the category of services for
which compensation was allowed.5 6 The new provisions allowed com-
pensation for services rendered by indenture trustees and reimbursement
for expenses incurred by indenture trustees, creditors, stockholders and
other parties in interest and their attorneys.5 7 Furthermore, activities eli-
gible for compensation not only included services that contributed to
confirmation of a plan, but also those beneficial to the administration of
the estate.5"
The statutory language and legislative history of Sections 242 and 243
reveal that Congress intended59 to grant indenture trustees an allowance
52. See In re Middle West Util. Co., 17 F. Supp. 359, 364 (N.D. Ill. 1936). Congress
had attempted to remove the fixing of allowances from the domain of the reorganization
committees. See id.
53. 1 SEC Report, supra note 26, at 902. The SEC stressed that "[t]he standard
should be sufficiently broad and flexible to give... recognition to the value of services
rendered in submission of suggestions for plans, or in opposing confirmation of plans."
Id
54. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 900 (codified at II U.S.C. §§ 642-43
(1976)) (repealed 1978). The Chandler Act became effective on September 22, 1938. See
Dickinson Indus. Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 383 (1940).
55. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
56. See 6A Collier (14th ed. 1978), supra note 50, 13.01, at 519 n.23 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 6439, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 186 (1937)).
57. See 8 SEC Report, supra note 26, at 253. The Chandler Act recognized such
claimants as fiduciaries. See Dickinson Indus. Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 389 n.7
(1940). The SEC lauded Congress' passage of the Chandler Act as a measure to accom-
plish the objective of more active and independent creditor representation in the reorgani-
zation process. The SEC noted that the Chandler Act "broaden[ed] the area of
representation consistently with the mandate of Chapter X, while keeping it within
bounds of expense not burdensome to the estate." 8 SEC Report, supra note 26, at 253.
In addition, the Supreme Court, in Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S.
416 (1972), noted the widespread abuses that the Chandler Act was designed to cure and
acknowledged the comprehensive role played by the SEC in the "protection of public
investors." Id. at 422.
58. See text of §§ 242 and 243, codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 642, 643 (1976) (repealed
1978); see also former Bankr. Rule 10-215(c)(1)(B), 11 U.S.C. app. (1976) (reasonable
compensation and reimbursement of expenses allowed by court to parties in interest for
services beneficial to the administration of the estate).
59. Both the Chandler Act and the Trust Indenture Act were adopted as the result of
the congressionally mandated SEC Report. See Caplin, 406 U.S. at 422. See also 8 SEC
Report, supra note 26, at 341 n.13 (SEC concluded that its recommendations contained
in Part 6 of its SEC Report were "enacted into law by the Trust Indenture Act of 1939").
The SEC submitted Part 6 of the Report, entitled "Trustees Under Indentures," to Con-
gress in 1936 and thus Part 6 was available for use by Congress when it drafted and
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for compensation for services rendered and expenses incurred as a result
of their expanded role and increased duties. Chapter X reflected "the
enlarged role which such [indenture] trustees may play thereunder in
representing and safeguarding the interests of securities issued pursuant
to such indentures." 6
The Chandler Act modified the more restrictive allowance provisions
and decisional law of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and
placed the ultimate power to grant allowances in the court's discretion. 6 ,
The Chandler Act limited applications for reimbursement to services or
conduct that benefited the estate. 62 Thus, because the Bankruptcy Code
incorporates certain Chandler Act principles, the Supreme Court's early
benefit-to-the-estate test enunciated under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy
Act continues to be relevant.63 Only nonduplicative services that are
beneficial to the estate are compensable.
B. Impact of Chandler Act Decisions
Courts continue to disagree over the meaning of "beneficial."' 6  Ac-
cording to decisions interpreting the Chandler Act, beneficial services
embrace "(1) services contributing to the plans of reorganization ap-
subsequently enacted both the Chandler Act and the Trust Indenture Act. See Caplin,
406 U.S. at 422; see also H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1939) (Trust
Indenture bill was "in large part based upon the findings and recommendations contained
in the [Securities and Exchange] Commission's reports"). The SEC recommended that
Congress "refashion the trust indenture for the purpose of according greater protection to
investors. That entails prescribing certain minimum standard specifications for the con-
duct of trustee" to protect bondholder interests. 6 SEC Report, supra note 26, at 6.
Courts routinely awarded indenture trustees reasonable compensation for services ren-
dered and expenses incurred as an administrative allowance under the Chandler Act to
the extent that the services provided were within the prudent-man standard prescribed by
§ 77ooo of the Trust Indenture Act. See In re Pacific Homes, 20 Bankr. 729, 749-50
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1376, 1387-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
60. S. Rep. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 23 (1938). As a result of the
Chandler Act, an indenture trustee could also file an answer to a petition (§ 126 of the
Bankruptcy Act and Rule 10-112); it could file claims (§ 197 of the Bankruptcy Act and
Rule 401(b)); it could file a plan of reorganization (§§ 167(b), 169 and 170 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and Rule 301(c)); it was entitled to notice (§ 207 of the Bankruptcy Act and
Rule 10-209); it had the right to be heard (§ 206 of the Bankruptcy Act and Rule 10-210);
and it had the right to administrative allowances for compensation and expenses (§ 242 of
the Bankruptcy Act and Rule 10-215(c)(1)(B)). The Bankruptcy Code has similar provi-
sions. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 343 (1988) (right to examine the debtor); id. § 501(a) (right
to file a proof of claim); id. § 503(b)(3)(D) (right to administrative expenses); id.
§ 1109(b) (right to be heard); id. § 1121(c) (right to file a plan).
61. See 8 SEC Report, supra note 26, at 253; see also Dickinson Indus. Site, Inc. v.
Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 385 (1940) (allowances for compensation and reimbursement made
at discretion of court).
62. Additionally, as was the case under § 77(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, consumma-
tion of a plan of reorganization continued not to be a condition precedent to the granting
of an allowance under the Chandler Act. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 642, 643 (1976) (codification
of §§ 242, 243) (repealed 1978).
63. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 92-115 and accompanying text.
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proved by the court; (2) services leading to disapproval of plans rejected
as being unfair or economically untenable; and (3) services which aided
the administration of the estates."65 In In re Continental Investment
Corp., 6 a bankruptcy case involving a holding company engaged in both
the insurance and investment advisory fields, a First Circuit court used
the Southern District of New York's benefit definition developed in In re
Yale Express System, In 67 as a starting point for its analysis of Sections
242 and 243.68 The Continental Investment court accepted the indenture
trustee's claim that its fiduciary duties compelled its services, and there-
fore it should not be bound by the benefit-to-the-estate test.
The language of Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code probably influ-
enced the Continental Investment court, even though the court reached
its decision under the Chandler Act.69 In evaluating the services pro-
vided by another claimant, a creditor's committee, the court stated that a
compromise between a claimant and another party was a "substantial
contribution."7 The phrase "substantial contribution" does not appear
in either Section 242 or 243. 71 This broad definition of substantial contri-
bution, which, according to the First Circuit, includes compromise, con-
tinues to mature today.
A more liberal view has expanded the interpretation of Sections 242
and 243. The sections "[have] been consistently construed to also require
that the applicants have rendered services which are beneficial to the es-
tates."72 This interpretation allows compensation to indenture trustees
who oppose the interests of the estate in certain situations involving con-
flicts of interest, barring an absolute rule prohibiting such conflicts. 73
65. In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also
In re Continental Inv. Corp., 28 Bankr. 972, 979 (D. Mass. 1982) (discussing those fac-
tors "to which courts look in determining compensation for services rendered by a
Trustee").
66. 28 Bankr. at 972.
67. 366 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Yale Express is a publicly owned integrated
transportation company with numerous subsidiaries and thus is regulated by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. Yale Express began reorganization proceedings after its
failed acquisition of a freight forwarder. See id. at 1380. Based in part on the difficulty of
the seven-year reorganization, the court began its Chandler Act analysis by noting that
compensation "should not be niggardly" and "should be generous enough to encourage
competent lawyers." Id. at 1381. The court considered many factors in reaching its
decision to grant the indenture trustee's application, such as the trustee's statutory role,
its objection to a proposed sale of certain real estate holdings (which in turn resulted in a
substantial increase in value to the estate), an objection to a debt set-off, the above aver-
age competence of the trustee's counsel, and the recommendations of the SEC. See id. at
1387.
68. "[C]ompensation to indenture trustees is governed by § 242, which does not limit
compensation to the 'benefit' standard of § 243." Continental Inv., 28 Bankr. at 985.
69. See supra note 22.
70. In re Continental Inv. Corp., 28 Bankr. 972, 986 (D. Mass. 1982).
71. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 642, 643 (1976) (codification of §§ 242, 243) (repealed 1978).
72. In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
73. See Iannotti v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (In re New York, N. H. & H.
R.R.), 567 F.2d 166, 179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977).
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Thus, this view, in its enlarged analysis of Sections 242 and 243, advo-
cates the use of judicial discretion.
Another version of the benefit-to-the-estate test distinguishes services
rendered by the claimant that benefit the estate from those that primarily
benefit the claimant.74 The differences among the views are accentuated
by consideration of other factors, such as the interplay between Section
77B and Section 242 and the importance of the policy aims behind the
Trust Indenture Act. 5
Still another approach does not limit those parties entitled to compen-
sation to a list of specific entities. In a bankruptcy proceeding concern-
ing the validity of fees-compensation-reimbursement previously awarded
to two institutional indenture trustees, the court stated that "[t]hose who
in good faith provide valuable services" are entitled to compensation.76
Other courts, however, limit claimants to those services authorized by
Sections 242 and 243. In an unusual case, one bankruptcy court ignored
a rigorous benefit-to-the-estate test and instead based its decision to reim-
burse on the uncommon nature of the case and the moral and legal obli-
gation owed to a nursing home's residents.77 Thus, while most courts
engage in some form of benefit-to-the-estate test, the meaning of the term
"benefit" under the Chandler Act varies from providing a valuable con-
tribution to fulfilling a moral obligation.
In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code,78 thus replacing the
Chandler Act. Congress derived Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
74. See Citibank, N.A. v. Multiponics, Inc. (In re Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 731,
733 (5th Cir. 1980). The court set forth twelve factors to be used in considering an award
of attorneys' fees. They are:
(1) [t]he time and labor required; (2) [t]he novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions; (3) [t]he skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) [t]he
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
(5) [t]he customary fee; (6) [w]hether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) [tlime
limitations imposed by the client or other circumstances; (8) [t]he amount in-
volved and the results obtained; (9) [t]he experience, reputation, and ability of
the attorneys; (10) [t]he 'undesirability' of the case; (11) [t]he nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; (12) [a]wards in similar
cases.
Id. at 733; see also In re Pacific Homes, 20 Bankr. 729, 736-37 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982)
(services benefiting only applicant's client are noncompensable).
75. The Fifth Circuit has stated that "[w]hile counsel need not show his services spe-
cifically benefitted the administration or protection of the estate as had been required by
§ 77B, the predecessor of Section 242, economy of administration remains a proper con-
cern." Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d at 733. In addition, the court acknowledged that,
"like the Bankruptcy Act, [the Trust Indenture Act] mandates the participation of inden-
ture trustees in reorganization proceedings .... I d. at 734. Furthermore, the Multipon-
ics court implicitly rejected the tangible-benefit test and acknowledged its use of judicial
discretion in allocating the estate's limited resources. See id. at 734-35.
76. King Resources Co. v. Phoenix Resources Co. (In re King Resources Co.), 651
F.2d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981).
77. See Pacific Homes, 20 Bankr. at 737-39; see also Creditors' Comm. # 1 v. Os-
borne (In re THC Fin. Corp.), 659 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1981) (compensating applicant
for superior services with market rates), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977 (1982).
78. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
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from Sections 64a(l), 242 and 243 of the Chandler Act, however.79 As a
result of this interaction, much of the case law developed under the
Chandler Act remains in effect.80
C. Congressional Rejection of Attempts to Limit Favorable
Allowance Provisions
On July 30, 1973, the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States ("CBL") filed with Congress a comprehensive report on the defi-
ciencies of the nation's bankruptcy laws."1 Among other recommenda-
tions, the CBL Report proposed limitations on allowances.82 The CBL
Report employed the phrase "substantial contribution," which may have
been borrowed from case law under Section 77B. Moreover, the CBL
Report sought to eliminate the indenture trustee's special status.8 3 The
SEC, however, opposed the CBL's attempt' to revive the more limited
procedure that had been used under Section 77B. a5 In all subsequent
drafts of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress rejected the CBL's proposal
79. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 355 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6311.
80. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
81. See S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5787, 5787.
82. See CBL Report, supra note 44, pt. 1, at 107. The Commission's report, which
was mostly disregarded, would in effect have repealed the favorable treatment of inden-
ture trustees and others under §§ 242 and 243 of the Chandler Act and revived the nar-
rower interpretation of § 77B. In addition, the CBL Report would have limited
reimbursement to situations where a plan had been confirmed. See id.
83. See id., pt. 2, at 107; see, e.g., Warren v. Palmer, 132 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1942)
("The criterion of reasonableness under § 77B ... was... contribution in some substan-
tial manner to the 'working out' of a plan of reorganization."); In re Mountain States
Power Co., 118 F.2d 405, 408 (3d Cir. 1941) (accountant, who was member of preferred
stockholders' committee, "made a substantial contribution to the successful result
achieved in this proceeding"); In re Midland United Co., 64 F. Supp. 399, 408 (D. Del.
1946) (attorney representing trustee for utilities "contributed very substantially" to the
reorganization plan), aff'd, 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1947); In re La France Indus., Inc., 42
F. Supp. 642, 647 (E.D. Pa. 1942) ("contribution" of the indenture trustee and counsel
"was a substantial one").
84. See Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judi-
cial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 764 (1975)
(Supplementary Statement II, Report of Securities and Exchange Commission on S. 235
and S. 236) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. The SEC opposed such limited procedures in
the 1930's. This opposition influenced Congress and resulted in the Chandler Act of
1938. See id.
85. The SEC recommended removal of CBL proposals that would inhibit active par-
ticipation in the reorganization process and would bar compensation for successful oppo-
sition to confirmation of a plan, as was common under existing case law. See id. at 734.
According to the SEC,
[t]he [CBL] bills repeal the existing authority to compensate voluntary commit-
tees, investors and their representatives for successful opposition to proposals of
the trustee or debtor on a business or legal matter or for defeating an unfair
plan. This would have the effect of inhibiting presentation of conflicting views
to the court.
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and instead based Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code on Sections
242 and 243 of the Chandler Act. Despite Congress' rejection of the
CBL Report, an imprecise substantial contribution standard was incor-
porated into the text of Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby
creating confusion and problems of interpretation.
Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Code preserved the special status ac-
corded indenture trustees.8 6 Thus, Congress effectively disassociated it-
self from the CBL Report. In Section 503's legislative history, Congress
attributed the roots of the phrase "substantial contribution" to Sections
242 and 243 of the Chandler Act. 7 The phrase does not appear in either
of these sections, however. It seems likely, then, that Congress used
"substantial contribution" as shorthand for the last sentence of Section
243:
In fixing any such allowances, the judge shall give consideration only
to the services which contributed to the plan confirmed or to the re-
fusal of confirmation of a plan, or which were beneficial in the adminis-
tration of the estate, and to the proper costs and expenses incidental
thereto. 8
Former Bankruptcy Rule 10-215(c)(1)(B) contains similar language.89
The principal test under Sections 242 and 243 was "the benefit to the
debtor's estate, the creditors, and, to the extent relevant, the stockhold-
ers."90 Perhaps because of the relation Section 503 bears to former Sec-
tions 242 and 243, this test "continues to be the touchstone for
compensating professional services" 91 under the Bankruptcy Code. De-
spite this apparent agreement as to the origin of Section 503 and the
86. Like § 242 of the Chandler Act, § 503(b) explicitly permits indenture trustees
reasonable compensation. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 642 (1976) (codification of § 242) with
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(5) (1988).
"[l]t is difficult to argue that a category of professional fees and costs not expressly
enumerated within § 503(b) is entitled to consideration." In re FRG, Inc., 124 Bankr.
653, 658 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). "Only those services and expenses which were per-
formed or incurred by entities described in section 503(b)(3)(D) during the pendency of
the Chapter 11 case and which constituted a 'substantial contribution' to the Chapter 11
case, are eligible for reimbursement on an administrative priority basis." In re Balport
Constr. Co., 123 Bankr. 174, 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
87. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 355 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 6311; S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5852-53.
"[W]here, as here, Congress adopts a new law... [it] normally can be presumed to
have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the [old] law." Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 581 (1978).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 643 (1976) (codification of § 243 of the Chandler Act) (repealed
1978).
89. See Bankr. Rule 10-215 (c)(1)(B), 11 U.S.C. app. (1976). Section 330(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code contains comparable provisions. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1988).
90. 3 Collier, supra note 6, at 503-48.
91. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 50 Bankr. 885, 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); see
also In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 Bankr. 557, 566 n.7 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985)




analysis to be applied, however, no consensus exists as to the meaning of
the term "benefit."
92
Some courts interpret the lack of definition for "benefit" and "substan-
tial contribution" as a signal to employ their equity powers.93 Another
court reacted differently. By refusing to employ its equity powers, that
court suggested that all applicants will suffer from this congressional
imprecision.94
D. Despite Agreement as to Origin of Substantial Contribution, No
Agreement Exists as to the Application of "Benefit"
to this Standard
Courts seem to agree that the phrase "substantial contribution" was
derived from Sections 242 and 243 of the Bankruptcy Act.95 Nonethe-
less, interpretational problems continue because of the differing statutory
language contained in the Chandler Act and the Bankruptcy Code.
While Section 503(b) uses the phrase "substantial contribution," Sections
92. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio has found that "devel-
oping a consensual plan, assisting the compromise of appointment of the Investment
Banker and aiding in litigation strategy" are specific contributions beneficial to the estate.
White Motor Credit, 50 Bankr. at 908. The Southern District of Ohio rejected applica-
tions by four indenture trustees because "[i]t cannot be said that their efforts were for
some broader purpose than to serve the individual clients, because, in fact, their clients
represented virtually the entire creditor burden on [the] estate." In re Rockwood Com-
puter Corp., 61 Bankr. 961, 966 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
While White Motor Credit and Rockwood Computer were decided by two different
courts faced with markedly different factual circumstances, the applicants for reimburse-
ment performed similar services. The different results make sense only if the courts used
different definitions of what constitutes a benefit.
93. "§ 503(b) does not recite a cut-and-dried list of entities only that should be al-
lowed administrative expense treatment for reasonable compensation for their attorneys.
Instead, the list of entities contains merely examples which should be expanded when
appropriate." In re Perdido Motel Group, Inc., 115 Bankr. 340, 342-43 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1990); see also In re Catalina Spa & R.V. Resort, Ltd., 97 Bankr. 13, 19 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1989) (bankruptcy court has wide discretion to determine compensable administra-
tive expenses).
94. See In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 Bankr. 246, 249 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1990). But see In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 Bankr. 557, 565 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1985) (court found same statutory language "relatively clear").
95. See Jensen-Farley, 47 Bankr. at 566 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 355 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 6311; S. Rep.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5787, 5852-53); accord Christian Life Center Litig. Defense Center v. Silva (In re Chris-
tian Life Center), 821 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987); Pierson & Gaylen v. Creel &
Atwood (In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc.), 785 F.2d 1249, 1252 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986);
In re Catalina Spa & R.V. Resort, Ltd., 97 Bankr. 13, 16 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989); Rob-
erts v. Petroleum World, Inc. (Ex parte Roberts), 93 Bankr. 442, 444 n.2 (D.S.C. 1988);
In re Texaco, Inc., 90 Bankr. 622, 627 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also In re Grynberg,
19 Bankr. 621, 623 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) ("§ 503(b)(3)(D) is the progeny of§ 243, as it
may thus be justifiably assumed Congress intended to perpetuate the right ... to reim-
bursement for expenses incurred in connection with valuable services to the estate");
Bankr. Laws. Ed. § 21:54 132 (1988) ("substantial contribution" is derived from the
Bankruptcy Act).
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242 and 243 used words such as "contributed" and "beneficial." 96 In its
enactment of Section 503(b), "Congress intended to adhere to the 'direct
benefit' rule of decisions under Sections 242 and 243 of the Bankruptcy
Act, without the requirement of a confirmed plan, and, with respect to
superseded custodianships, to the 'equitable benefit' doctrine." 97 Thus,
Congress has impliedly asserted an intention to preserve the benefit-to-
the-estate standard of analysis. Despite this congressional urging, a ten-
sion exists between the need to interpret Section 503(b) broadly to en-
courage meaningful participation in reorganizations and to preserve the
estate's resources by limiting administrative costs. This tension dates
from the Supreme Court's creation of the equitable benefit doctrine9" in
its interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
Historically, certain conduct does not produce a substantial contribu-
tion. Services conferred primarily for the benefit of the petitioning credi-
tor do not result in a benefit to the estate. 99 Moreover, an incidental
benefit" alone is insufficient basis' 01 upon which to grant administrative
priority.'0 2 Cognizant of congressional attitudes, at least one court has
construed statutory priorities narrowly in order to preserve the value of
congressionally preferred priorities.'0 3 Another court rejected the argu-
96. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988) (Bankruptcy Code) with 11 U.S.C. §§ 642-43
(1976) (Chandler Act) (repealed 1978). Because the origin of § 503(b) is not in dispute,
the phrase "substantial contribution" must have the same meaning as the words "contrib-
uted" and "beneficial." See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
97. In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 Bankr. 557, 565 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985);
accord In re Med Gen., Inc., 17 Bankr. 13, 14 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); In re Valley Isle
Broadcasting, Ltd., 56 Bankr. 505, 506 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985).
98. See Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533, 539 (1903); see also supra note 27 (ex-
plaining equity receivership).
99. See In re Kam, 106 Bankr. 207, 209 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1989); see also Manufactur-
ers Hanover Trust Co. v. Bartsh (In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig.), 874 F.2d 576,
581 (8th Cir. 1989) (bankruptcy estate should not reimburse for services and expenses
that "primarily benefit the debenture holders"); In re Standard Metals Corp., 105 Bankr.
625, 630 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (applicants did not overcome presumption that their
actions were taken primarily for benefit of their clients and not estate as a whole).
100. One court reduced its fee award because the benefit was more than incidental but
"the evidence [was] less than clear that... representatives provided something more than
an indirect benefit to the estates." In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 Bankr. 321, 341
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
101. See Flight Transp., 874 F.2d at 581; see also In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg.,
Ltd., 119 Bankr. 246, 251 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (incidental refers to accidental, inad-
vertent or unintentional result). This does not mean that a plan must be confirmed in
order to satisfy the substantial contribution test. Quite to the contrary, substantial contri-
bution "does not require a contribution that leads to confirmation of a plan, for in many
cases, it will be a substantial contribution if the person involved uncovers facts that would
lead to a denial of confirmation, such as fraud ...." In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc.,
47 Bankr. 557, 566 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (citation omitted); see also In re Texaco, Inc.,
90 Bankr. 622, 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (substantial contribution must result in de-
monstrable benefit to the debtor's estate); In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 60 Bankr.
892, 897 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (services are compensable under § 503 regardless of the
litigation's ultimate disposition).
102. See supra note 5.
103. See In re Philadelphia Mortgage Trust, 117 Bankr. 820, 826-28 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
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ment that an extension of credit made a substantial contribution to the
debtor's reorganization, stating that "the tenor of the cases suggests that
items supplied to the estate must be essential for the preservation of the
estate."'" Finally, services considered a part of the claimant's normal
tasks, engaged in primarily for the benefit of the claimant, do not qualify
as a substantial contribution.10
5
No consensus exists among courts as to the propriety of granting
claims for pre-petition expenses and fees that an applicant incurs. Sec-
tion 503 does not explicitly address pre-petition claims, yet courts, seem-
ingly relying on their equitable powers, have both granted and denied
such claims, further confusing any understanding of Section 503.
"[C]ourts may give the broadest latitude in the interpretation of what
constitutes substantial contribution .... [I]t is impossible to lay down
hard and fast rules to determine what is, in a given case, substantial
contribution.""°
Some courts have based their decisions entirely upon whether the pre-
petition services conferred a benefit on the estate. Thus, if a claimant
conferred such a benefit, the court granted an allowance awarding the
applicant reimbursement for services and fees."07 One court even al-
lowed a pre-petition contract claim for indenture trustee fees and ex-
penses under Section 506(b) based on the increased value of the estate
after reorganization. 08 Some courts that have rejected applications for
reimbursement of pre-petition claims have found that the literal meaning
of Section 503 must be applied and applications denied "absent a result
demonstrably at odds with legislative intent.""' 9 These courts argue that
had Congress intended to reimburse pre-petition claims from the pro-
ceeds of a bankruptcy estate, it would have included a provision in the
Bankruptcy Code.
In a more liberal interpretation of Section 503, one court awarded both
attorneys' fees and compensation for services to an indenture trustee for
its vital and highly visible role. "o The court made no mention of benefit
1990). The court denied the application of the debtor's trustee under a trust agreement
stating that expenses must benefit the debtor and not merely further the self-interest of
the claimant or merely provide an incidental benefit. See id.
104. In re Patch Graphics, 58 Bankr. 743, 745 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986). But see In re
Ohio Ferro-Alloys Corp., 96 Bankr. 795, 797-98 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (loan to
restructure debtor's working capital was a substantial contribution).
105. See In re Gillette Assoc., Ltd., 101 Bankr. 866, 881 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989).
106. In re Russell Transfer, Inc., 59 Bankr. 871, 873 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986).
107. See In re Valley Isle Broadcasting, Ltd., 56 Bankr. 505, 506 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1985); In re Med Gen., Inc., 17 Bankr. 13, 14-15 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); see also In re
Texaco, Inc., 90 Bankr. 622, 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (demonstrable benefit must be
shown in order for pre-petition expenses to be allowed).
108. See In re Gillette Assoc., Ltd., 101 Bankr. 866, 878 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989).
109. In re Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 110 Bankr. 535, 537 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
110. See In re Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 18 Bankr. 834, 838-39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
The court acknowledged that its basis for the award was its own knowledge of the "extent
and value of the services" provided by the indenture trustee. Id. The court also recog-
nized that the "strict economy of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 has been abandoned." Id.
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except to the extent that it noted the indenture trustee played a vital role
in the reorganization."' Following this liberal approach to Section 503
applications, some courts have concluded that a substantial contribution
may be made by an individual member of a creditors' committee' 1 2 or by
raising an objection to or even entering into a post-petition agreement. 13
Such an agreement may increase the value of the estate and consequently
confer a benefit on it." 4 In addition, those parties who wind up the es-
tate's affairs and at the same time confer a benefit on the estate must be
111. See id.
112. The controversy surrounding the propriety of compensating individual members
of a creditor's committee provides another opportunity for divergent interpretations of
§ 503 and the term benefit. One court, using a benefit-to-the-estate test, found that reim-
bursement of members of committees or the committees themselves may be justified as an
administrative expense under § 503(b)(1) or with respect to individual members, under
§ 503(b)(3)(D) "since they individually make a substantial contribution to the reorgani-
zation by agreeing to serve on the committees." In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 74 Bankr. 885,
890 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987); see also In re Kam, 106 Bankr. 207, 209 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1989) (creditor must benefit estate in order to receive compensation); In re J.E. Jennings,
Inc., 96 Bankr. 500, 501 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("[o]ther courts have discovered a distinction
made by Section 503 between committees per se and committee members"); In re Farm
Bureau Servs., Inc., 32 Bankr. 69, 71 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) ("committee members
must do more than faithfully attend meetings and contribute thoughts and opinions in
order to recover expenses").
113. See In re McLean Indus., Inc., 88 Bankr. 36, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). For
example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that an agreement for the installa-
tion of individual gas utility meters by a creditor in each apartment was a substantial
contribution to the estate because the installation allowed the debtor to reorganize by
selling the individual apartments. See In re Washington Lane Assoc., 79 Bankr. 241, 244
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
114. See McLean, 88 Bankr. at 38; see also American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal
Corp. v. Leonardo Arrivabene, S.A., 280 F.2d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 1960) ("The right to
priority in the event the.., debtor in possession receives benefits.. . 'is an equitable right
based upon the reasonable value' of the benefits conferred") (citation omitted). Another
option available to courts is a middle ground or compromise. Rather than deny all ex-
penses incurred, a court may grant certain expenses administrative priority under § 503.
See supra note 5; see, e.g., In re Packard Properties, Ltd., 118 Bankr. 61, 63-64 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1990) (unclear how certain charges for supplies, contingencies and professional
services benefited the estate, but sufficient evidence to support reimbursement for insur-
ance, utilities, landscape maintenance and taxes); In re Moore, 109 Bankr. 777, 780
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) ("court has broad discretion to determine whether a claim for
an administrative expense is, in actuality, an administrative expense").
In addition, applicants for compensation have argued that their opposition to various
pre- and post-petition agreements and plans of reorganization, their cooperation with
trustees and receivers, and their assistance locating various holders have provided a bene-
fit to the estate, and thus have made a substantial contribution. See, e.g., In re White
Motor Credit Corp., 50 Bankr. 885, 908 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (indenture trustee's
beneficial contributions included developing consensual plan, assisting in compromise,
and aiding in litigation strategies); In re Med Gen., Inc., 17 Bankr. 13, 14 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1981) (pre-petition activity resulted in beneficial results), see also Kelley Dryc &
Warren's Brief for Appellant at 13, 38-41, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Bartsh
(In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig.), 874 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-5414) (ap-
pellant argued, unsuccessfully, that indenture trustees who fulfill fiduciary duties under
Trust Indenture Act have provided a benefit and made a substantial contribution within
the meaning of § 503).
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assured of payment or they will not participate in the reorganization."'
Thus, winding up an estate's affairs may be considered a benefit.
This lack of uniformity in the application of the benefit-to-the-estate
test to such disparate concerns as equity powers, pre-petition allowances
and definitions of what constitutes a benefit renders the test nearly as
meaningless as the term "substantial," which the present-day benefit-to-
the-estate test is designed to clarify.
Despite its widespread use, the benefit-to-the-estate test is defective
due to the many contrary meanings that courts attach to the term "bene-
fit." Some courts simply require a benefit to the estate, while others re-
quire a demonstrable'1 6 or a tangible" 17 benefit. Thus, courts have found
many different types of conduct to be beneficial to an estate.
III. OTHER TESTS
As a result of the emphasis placed on different factors, "' courts have
developed different and often contradictory tests"I9 to determine whether
indenture trustees have made a substantial contribution to a reorganiza-
tion. Significantly, many of these tests are applied only by the court cre-
ating the test and often only to the case at bar. 20 This failure to proffer
an adequate basis for judging a Section 503 application provides little
guidance to the would-be applicant.
Most standards developed to assess whether an applicant has made a
substantial contribution are based on the benefit-to-the-estate test and
Section 503's legislative history. Some courts have modified the benefit-
to-the-estate test 121 by establishing threshold inquiries,"2  developing
115. See In re Cascade Oil Co., 51 Bankr. 877, 881 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985).
116. See infra notes 134-145 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
118. Such factors include: degree of significance of services, perceived congressional
priorities, impact of conduct, type of bankruptcy proceeding, impact of decision on estate
or applicant, first hand knowledge of the court, recommendations by other bankruptcy
participants, pre-petition or post-petition expenses, individual member or committee ex-
pense, duplication or nonduplication of services, reasonableness of expense, degree of ex-
pertise, imaginative assistance, and judicial interpretation of § 503. See. eg., In re
George Worthington Co., 913 F.2d 316, 321-22 (6th Cir.) (no basis for creditor's commit-
tee reimbursement), reh'g granted, vacated, 921 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1990); Iannotti v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (In re New York, N. H. & H. RIR.). 567 F.2d 166,
179 (2d Cir.) (creditors' assistance was imaginative), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977); In
re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 Bankr. 246, 249 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (testi-
mony of disinterested party has proven decisive); In re Philadelphia Mortgage Trust, 117
Bankr. 820, 827 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (consideration of congressional intent); In re
D'Lites of Am., Inc., 108 Bankr. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (applicant must prove
significant benefit); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 Bankr. 321, 338 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1987) (consideration of type of benefit conferred and whether services were duplicative).
119. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
120. For example, the Fifth Circuit is the only court to apply the foster-and-enhance
test in the context of an application by an indenture trustee. See infra notes 156-160 and
accompanying text.
121. Both the actual-direct-and-demonstrable-benefit and the tangible-benefit tests are
refinements of the benefit-to-the-estate tests.
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elaborate terminology to substitute for an apparent lack of legislative gui-
dance, 23 using judicial discretion,1 24 weighing the respective costs,1 25 or
acknowledging Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act as a foundation for
decision. 26 Many of these other tests, including the actual-direct-and-
demonstrable-benefit and tangible-benefit tests, are in essence mere mat-
ters of degree, refinements or permutations of the benefit-to-the-estate
test. Still other tests are judicially created with no grounding in the
benefit-to-the-estate test. For example, the but-for test, and to a lesser
extent the foster-and-enhance-rather-than-retard-or-interrupt-the-reor-
ganization-process test, appear to stem from innovation and whim,
rather than from congressional guidance. Courts do, however, agree on
certain limited matters. 127
A. Significance Test
Despite the lack of textual coherence 128 between the Chandler Act and
the Bankruptcy Code, Section 503's substantial contribution test repre-
sents the dividing line between services that are compensable as adminis-
trative claims and those that are not. 129 Some courts grant applications
for reimbursement only when the claimant's services reach a significant
level.13o The use of the significance test parallels the benefit-to-the-estate
test: only conduct that produces tangible benefits' 3 ' or promotes the re-
organization process is compensable. Still other courts use this signifi-
cance test as a threshold measure to assess whether further inquiry is
122. See infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
123. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. The foster-and-enhance-rather-than-
retard-or-interrupt-the-reorganization-process test offers as little guidance to the would-
be applicant as the phrase "substantial contribution." The tangible-benefit test, however,
at least offers a more succinct standard-materiality.
124. See infra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
125. Courts consider both human and monetary costs. See, e.g., In re Cutler Mfg.
Corp., 95 Bankr. 230, 232 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (questioning fiduciary duty of self-
interested directors); Roberts v. Petroleum World, Inc. (Ex parte Roberts), 93 Bankr.
442, 445 (D.S.C. 1988) (claimant's efforts may have resulted in additional $75,000 to
unsecured creditors); In re Pacific Homes, 20 Bankr. 729, 737 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982)
(recognizing significant human cost in retirement home reorganization).
126. See, e.g., Christian Life Center Litig. Defense Center v. Silva (In re Christian Life
Center), 821 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The principal test of substantial contribu-
tion under the 1898 Act was the extent of benefit to the estate, and the same test applies
to claims under comparable section 503(b)(3)(D)"); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79
Bankr. 321, 337 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) ("The established rule under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 was ... only services actually rendered in preparing, filing and prosecuting
an involuntary petition were deemed reimburseable").
127. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
129. See Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Bartsh (In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec.
Litig.), 874 F.2d 576, 582 (8th Cir. 1989).
130. Significant has been defined as "[s]omething more than minimal assistance to the
estate .... ." In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 Bankr. 246, 253 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1990); see also In re D'Lites of Am., Inc., 108 Bankr. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1989) (applicant must prove both significant and tangible benefits).
131. See D'Lites, 108 Bankr. at 356.
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required. Only when services reach a significant level will courts using
the test in this manner proceed to evaluate the claimant's activity as a
whole.'32 Application of this loose framework continues today and takes
many forms.
B. Actual-Direct-and-Demonstrable-Benefit Test
Few cases have investigated the special relationship between the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the Trust Indenture Act and their legislative histories.'33
Most courts that have examined this relationship have applied the actual-
direct-and-demonstrable-benefit test. Even those that have acknowl-
edged both a statutory fiduciary duty and a contractual duty on the part
of an indenture trustee nonetheless require "an actual and demonstrable
benefit to the debtor's estate."' 34 Most courts have rejected the argument
that indenture trustees need not make a substantial contribution to the
reorganization in order to receive compensation:
There is no distinction between indenture trustees and other applicants
for compensation under § 503, nor any conflict in the statutory lan-
guage of the Bankruptcy Act and the Trust Indenture Act. The Trust
Indenture Act sets forth duties and responsibilities of the indenture
trustee and has no bearing on the decision by Congress via § 503 to
compensate those particular indenture trustees which substantially
contribute to the bankruptcy proceeding. 35
In addition, duties that are routine or of no quantitative value to the
estate are not compensable. 36 Courts routinely require that the appli-
cant prove that its efforts conferred an "actual, direct and demonstrable
benefit upon the estate"' 3 7 before compensation is awarded.
132. See Mineral Office, 119 Bankr. at 253.
133. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
134. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Bartsh (In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Li-
tig.), 874 F.2d 576, 582 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, 47 Bankr.
557, 559 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985); see also In re W.T. Grant Co., 85 Bankr. 250, 269
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (case decided under Bankruptcy Act stating that "fulfillment of
an indenture trustee's duties are compensable [only] if they clearly benefit the estate and
are non-duplicative"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States Trust Co. v.
Pardo (In re W.T. Grant), 119 Bankr. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Pickens-Bond Constr.
Co., 83 Bankr. 581, 586 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1988) (requiring "actual, concrete benefit to
the estate"). But see Kelley Drye & Warren's Brief for Appellant at 37-38, Manufactur-
ers Hanover Trust Co. v. Bartsh (In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig.), 874 F.2d 576
(8th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-5414) (fulfillment of fiduciary duty is sufficient for award).
135. In re Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 112 Bankr. 191, 196 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989); see also
In re George Worthington Co., 913 F.2d 316, 325 (6th Cir.) (statutory language is clear
requiring substantial contribution by indenture trustees), reh'g granted. vacated, 921 F.2d
635 (6th Cir. 1990); In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 60 Bankr. 892, 895 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (substantial contribution test is independent of any contractual right to
reimbursement contained in an indenture).
136. See In re W.T. Grant Co., 85 Bankr. 250, 269 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States Trust Co. v. Pardo (In re W.T. Grant), 119
Bankr. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
137. In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 Bankr. 246, 252 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990); see also In re FRG, Inc., 124 Bankr. 653, 658 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (applicant
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One district court in the First Circuit, however, required "a measura-
ble and valuable benefit to the Debtor's estate"' 38 before it would award
compensation to an indenture trustee. This apparent refinement of the
test seems to be simply another articulation of the same standard. This
court found that the claimant's " 'watchdog services'... perceptibly ben-
efited the entire estate,"' 39 and therefore aided the administration of the
estate.
An example of the nuances between the various benefit tests is the ap-
plication of the actual-direct-and-demonstrable-benefit test to the ques-
tion of whether Section 503(b)(3)(D) authorizes reimbursement of either
the expenses of a creditors' committee or of the expenses of an individual
member of such a committee. 1" Following this test, one court denied
"must have had a direct, significant, and demonstrable positive effect upon the estate");
In re Standard Metals Corp., 105 Bankr. 625, 631 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (saving litiga-
tion costs did not result in actual and demonstrable benefit to estate and creditors).
138. In re Boston and Me. Corp., 62 Bankr. 199, 203 (D. Mass. 1986).
139. Idr
140. Courts often avoid a substantial contribution analysis if they are able to decide the
case or issues on other grounds. One such area surrounds reimbursement of creditors'
committees and individual members of such committees.
Several courts have concluded that Congress did not give them the actual authority or
discretion to allow reimbursement of expenses under § 503 for the services rendered by a
creditors' committee and thus to avoid the substantial contribution analysis. See In re
George Worthington Co., 913 F.2d 316, 325 (6th Cir.), reh'g granted, vacated, 921 F.2d
635 (6th Cir. 1990); In re Automotive Nat'l Brands, Inc., 65 Bankr. 412, 415 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1986); In re Major Dynamics, Inc., 16 Bankr. 279, 280 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
Another court found the committee member expenses to be compensable and to have
made a substantial contribution, and rejected calls for a technical reading of § 503 as
"ignor[ing] the structure of § 503(b); it is a reversal, without support in the legislative
history, of the law governing cases which arose under the Bankruptcy Act .... In re
GHR Energy Corp., 35 Bankr. 539, 540-41 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983). Another justifica-
tion for allowing reimbursement is the observation that "Section 503 is not comprehen-
sive and exclusive." In re Fireside Office Supply, Inc., 17 Bankr. 43, 45 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1981). Under a broad view of the Bankruptcy Code, if the Code does not expressly pro-
hibit certain action, it can be taken. See In re Labine, 42 Bankr. 883, 886 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1984). The court reasoned that committees perform such crucial roles in bank-
ruptcy proceedings that their theoretical contributions are sufficient to meet the substan-
tial contribution threshold. See id. at 886-87; see also 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (1988)
(creditor committee entitled to reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses in mak-
ing a substantial contribution). Section 1102(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code directs the
court to appoint a committee of unsecured creditors, in the absence of a pre-petition
creditors committee.
Courts that reject all forms of reimbursement universally base their decisions on a
literal reading of the Bankruptcy Code, which makes no mention of individual committee
members and bars reimbursement for committees appointed pursuant to § 1102 of the
Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988). These courts interpret the Bankruptcy Code as re-
quiring clear and specific authority to allow compensation, although they acknowledge
the possibility of undermining Congress' goal of active creditor participation in the pro-
ceedings. See In re J.E. Jennings, Inc., 67 Bankr. 106, 110-11 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986),
vacated, 96 Bankr. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Major Dynamics, Inc., 16 Bankr. 279, 280
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981). The legislative history of § 503 may be interpreted as indicating
that Congress, "for whatever reason," did not grant the bankruptcy court authority to
reimburse such committee expenses. See In re George Worthington Co., 913 F.2d 316,
321 (6th Cir.), reh'g granted, vacated, 921 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1990). Under a broad read-
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compensation for failure of the applicant, an individual creditor, to
"demonstrate that its services benefited the debtor's estate."'141 Like
courts employing other benefit tests,' 42 courts applying this test have yet
to define an actual, direct and demonstrable benefit. The definitional re-
quirements of the test suffer from imprecision. While offering somewhat
more guidance than the benefit-to-the-estate test by describing the type of
benefit required, the actual-direct-and-demonstrable-benefit test fails to
offer the would-be applicant certainty of result.
Finally, the role of judicial discretion complicates any attempt at a
universal view of an actual, direct or demonstrable benefit. The more
conservative view 43 declines to interpret Section 503(b) broadly, and re-
fuses to grant an application for allowance, "despite the very substantial
human benefit effected"'" when an applicant fails to demonstrate a di-
rect benefit to the estate.' 45
C. Tangible-Benefit Test
A somewhat more widely used test or definition of substantial contri-
bution requires a contribution that "provides tangible benefits to the
bankruptcy estate and to other unsecured creditors."'" While similar to
ing of § 503, however, "the proper interpretation is allowance of reimbursement ......
Ia at 326 (Jones, J. dissenting).
141. In re Moore, 109 Bankr. 777, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989). "Actual value or
benefit to the estate and not a 'reasonable value' should be the appropriate measure of
compensation." Id. at 783. In addition, the court stated that "[r]ather than allow an
administrative expense claim where the claimant shows a benefit to the estate, (a more
conservative] approach disallows such a claim where no benefit to the estate is established
by the movant." Id at 784.
142. Other benefit tests include the benefit-to-the-estate test and the tangible-benefit
test.
143. Applicants often interpret § 503(b) creatively in order to circumvent other Bank-
ruptcy Code provisions. Courts routinely impose limits on these creative interpretations.
For example, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected an attempt
to circumvent the requirements of § 327(a) of title I 1 of the United States Code, which
prohibits conflicts of interest among representatives of a debtor's estate through the use of
a § 503(b) claim. See In re Southern Diversified Properties, Inc., 110 Bankr. 992, 995
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990). The court could find "no statutory or case law authority per-
mitting an allowance for unauthorized legal services 'as if' the law firm represented one
of the entities specified in section 503(b)(3)(D)." Id. at 995. Another court stated that
"Congress cannot have intended that a professional person could sidestep the specific
requirements set forth and come in later and claim payment under the general provisions
of§ 503(b)(1)(A) .... In re Cutler Mfg. Corp., 95 Bankr. 230, 231 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1989); accord In re Channel 2 Assocs., 88 Bankr. 351, 352 (D.N.M. 1988); see also In re
Rakosi, 99 Bankr. 47, 50-51 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) (denial of fees under § 330(a), only
to sanction fees under § 503(b), is contrary to intent of Bankruptcy Code).
144. Velez v. St. Mary Hosp. (In re St. Mary Hosp.), 97 Bankr. 199, 203 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1989). But see In re Pacific Homes, 20 Bankr. 729, 737 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982)
(court granted allowance for indenture trustee in case involving bankruptcy of retirement
home with 1,800 residents).
145. See St. Mary, 97 Bankr. at 203.
146. In re Jack Winter Apparel, Inc., 119 Bankr. 629, 633 (E.D. Wis. 1990); see In re
D'Lites of Am., Inc., 108 Bankr. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); In re Ohio Ferro-
Alloys Corp., 96 Bankr. 795, 797-98 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (citing Armstrong World
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the benefit-to-the-estate test, the tangible-benefit test appears more
closely related to the actual-direct-and-demonstrable-benefit test because
of its requirement of material benefit. This test does not rely on syno-
nyms, however, as does the actual-direct-and-demonstrable-benefit test,
and provides courts more leeway to determine what constitutes a mate-
rial benefit to the estate.
Because determinations of substantial contribution must be made on a
case-by-case basis, rigid requirements serve no function in such an analy-
sis."'47 Although one court claimed that the integrity of Section 503 can
only be sustained "by strictly limiting compensation to extra ordinary
creditor actions which lead directly to significant and tangible bene-
fits,"' 148 all the benefit tests are loosely based on cases decided under Sec-
tion 77B of the Bankruptcy Act,'49 and therefore should produce similar
results. Any strict interpretation of Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code
would appear to contradict congressional intent and Supreme Court pre-
cedent. 150 Instead, based on the informed discretion of the court, all rea-
sonable services that confer a benefit' should be reimbursed.
Indus., Inc. v. James A. Phillips, Inc. (In re Phillips, Inc.), 29 Bankr. 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y.
1983)). The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio applied this tangible-
benefit test when it awarded administrative expense priority to a bank's loan, which had
been used to restructure the debtor's working capital. This court found that the loan had
made a substantial contribution to the estate because it had resulted in savings of up to
$250,000. See Ohio Ferro, 96 Bankr. at 798; see also In re W.T. Grant Co., 85 Bankr.
250, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (case decided under the Bankruptcy Act discussing
three-factor test that includes conferring a tangible benefit on all creditors as one prong),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nor. United States Trust Co. v. Pardo (In re W.T. Grant),
119 Bankr. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
147. See, e.g., In re Moore, 109 Bankr. 777, 780 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) ("The court
has broad discretion to determine whether a claim for an administrative expense is, in
actuality, an administrative expense."); In re Catalina Spa & R.V. Resort, Ltd., 97 Bankr.
13, 19 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) ("Determination of compensable administrative expenses
is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court."); see also Iannotti v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. (In re New York, N. H. & H. R.R.), 567 F.2d 166, 174 (2d Cir.)
("equity must be tailored to fit the particular case at hand"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833
(1977).
148. Catalina Spa, 97 Bankr. at 21. The court also mentions that compensation must
be preserved for instances when involvement "fosters and enhances" the estate. See id.
Thus, it appears that there is some overlap among the several tests.
149. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text; see also Christian Life Center Litig.
Defense Comm. v. Silva (In re Christian Life Center), 821 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir.
1987) (benefit-to-the-estate was and continues to be the principal test of substantial con-
tribution under the Bankruptcy Act and the Bankruptcy Code).
150. See supra notes 44, 51-52 and accompanying text; see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36, 43 (1986) ("'Iin expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sen-
tence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy' ") (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221
(1986)).
151. Compensation for any benefit conferred seems to be in keeping with the spirit of







zation-process test signifies a judicial reaction to the lack of congressional
guidance in the statutory language of Section 503. This test created
equally vague terminology15 2 that lacks clear definition. According to a
broader, more liberal interpretation of the role of judicial discretion,
courts may employ notions of equity, fairness and judicial independence
to interpret the text of Section 503 and develop standards to judge or
justify questionable or controversial fee and expense awards or to support
a claim of fostering and enhancing the process of reorganization. 53 A
more conservative approach would limit a court's reasonable discretion
to the "well-established construction of the statute."'" This view rea-
sons that Congress intended to limit judicial discretion in the interpreta-
tion of Section 503 as compared with the more liberal interpretation of its
predecessors."55
In In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc., 6 a frequently cited case, the
Fifth Circuit defined services that substantially contribute to a bank-
ruptcy case as those that "foster and enhance, rather than retard or inter-
rupt." ' 7 In In re Baldwin-United Corp., 5 8 the court added to the test by
152. For example, terms such as "foster," "enhance," "demonstrable, .... indirect," "in-
cidental," "minimal" and "benefit" offer little guidance to an applicant. See, e.g., Pierson
& Gaylen v. Creel & Atwood (In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc.), 785 F.2d 1249, 1253
(5th Cir. 1986) (foster and enhance); In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 Bankr.
246, 251 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (incidental); In re Texaco, Inc., 90 Bankr. 622, 630
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (demonstrable); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 Bankr. 321, 341
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (indirect benefit).
153. In determining whether to compensate a debtor's president for his efforts, one
court stated that "[i]t would be inequitable and unfair to deny him any compensation
from the debtor's estate" even though the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize
his compensation. In re Glade Springs, Inc., 77 Bankr. 184, 196 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.),
vacated by, 826 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1987). The Glade Springs court discussed fostering
and enhancing in the context of § 503 as one possible basis for compensation. See id. at
194; see also In re K-FAB, Inc., 118 Bankr. 240, 242 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (fee determination
based on "overall fairness and reasonableness").
Courts have broad discretion to determine the allowance of attorneys' fees and "that
exercise of discretion is not to be interfered with absent a showing that it has been
abused." Roberts v. Petroleum World, Inc. (Ex parte Roberts), 93 Bankr. 442, 445
(D.S.C. 1988) (quoting Jefferson v. Miss. Gulf Coast YMCA, Inc., 73 Bankr. 179, 183
(S.D. Miss. 1986)). A court's evaluation of services rendered during a Chapter XI pro-
ceeding along with services provided during a Chapter X proceeding is one example of
broad judicial discretion. See In re Continental Inv. Corp., 28 Bankr. 972, 978 (D. Mass.
1982). The court there deemed the Chapter X proceedings to relate back to the beginning
of the bankruptcy and thus found the services to be compensable where they ordinarily
would not have been. See id. at 978.
154. Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Rife (In re Rife), 71 Bankr. 129, 131 (Bankr. W.D. Va.),
aff'd, 102 Bankr. 57 (W.D. Va. 1987), rev'd, 876 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1989).
155. See id
156. 785 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1986).
157. Pierson & Gaylen v. Creel & Atwood (In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc.), 785
F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re White Motor Credit Corp., 50 Bankr. 885,
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considering the following factors, which seem to echo other tests:
(1) whether the services were rendered "solely to benefit the client, or to
benefit all of the parties to the case;" (2) whether the services provided
"a direct, significant and demonstrable benefit to the estates;" and
(3) whether the services rendered duplicated "services rendered by attor-
neys for the committee, the committees themselves, or the debtor and its
attorneys."' 59 The court concluded its foster-and-enhance test discus-
sion by stating that "[u]ltimately, what constitutes a substantial contribu-
tion must be left to the informed discretion of the Court based upon the
time sheets and other relevant evidence . . . ."I" Although it appears
that the foster-and-enhance test begins with some vague notions of signif-
icant conduct, it actually rests almost entirely on the court's discretion.
E. But-For Test
Judicial reactions to the lack of consensus regarding the characteriza-
tion of substantial contribution have varied. Some courts have resorted
to definitional exercises1 61 to resolve the impasse. For example, one
court seems to have borrowed from tort law and created a but-for test:
"involvement takes the form of constructive contributions in key reor-
ganizational aspects, when but for the role of the creditor, the movement
towards final reorganization would have been substantially dimin-
ished."1 62 Unfortunately, the but-for test illustrates the lack of unity in
the standards and creates a possibility of unjust results because of the
emphasis on different factors. Moreover, only one court has used this
test.
F. Uniform Approaches- What Courts Have In Common
Although courts apply different tests in determining what conduct is
to be reimbursed, courts share certain fundamental views. With uni-
formity, courts limit compensation when there has been obvious, unnec-
essary duplication of efforts.' 63 This limitation is based on decisions
892 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (quoting In re Richton Int'l Corp., 15 Bankr. 854, 856
(S.D.N.Y. 1981))); see also In re K-FAB, Inc., 118 Bankr. 240, 242 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1990) (defining services that substantially contribute as those that foster and enhance
rather than retard or interrupt). No other court has used this definition in the context of
a bankruptcy involving an indenture trustee. See Consolidated Bancshares, 785 F.2d at
1253; see also supra note 148 (case discussing the foster-and-enhance test).
158. 79 Bankr. 321 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
159. Id. at 338.
160. Id.
161. See, eg., In re K-FAB, Inc., 118 Bankr. 240, 242 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1990)
(use of foster-and-enhance-rather-than-retard-or-interrupt-the-reorganization-process
test); supra Part III (D) (discussion of same test).
162. In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 Bankr. 246, 250 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990) (quoting In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, Inc., 84 Bankr. 684, 690 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1988)) (emphasis added).
163. Courts universally deny reimbursement where the applicant's actions are self-in-
terested and duplicative, and therefore where no substantial contribution has been made.
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rendered under the Bankruptcy Act 1" and continues under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 65 Courts' refusal to reimburse applicants for duplicative
services assures that the estate is not unnecessarily depleted of its limited
resources.' 66 In addition, this policy promotes efficiency and communi-
cation between members of the bankruptcy proceeding. 6 '
Like the near universal rejection of compensation for duplicative serv-
ices, courts also agree that each applicant bears "the burden of proof to
establish the beneficence and propriety of his services .... ,,68 Noting the
difficulty in evaluating services, courts accord the bankruptcy judge
"substantial latitude... in the drawing process because he is best able to
observe and evaluate . Adopting this deferential attitude, the
See, e.g., In re Cutler Mfg. Corp., 95 BAnkr. 230, 231 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (claimant
was not disinterested party and therefore "§ 503 is an inappropriate mechanism" for
compensation); In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, Inc., 84 Bankr. 684, 689 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1988) (self-interested and duplicative services do not make a tangible benefit); In re Bos-
ton and Me. Corp., 62 Bankr. 199, 203 (D. Mass. 1986) (services "must not be merely
duplicative").
164. See In re Continental Inv. Corp., 28 Bankr. 972, 979 (D. Mass. 1982); In re Yale
Express Sys., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); supra note 46 and accompa-
nying text.
165. See, e.g., In re Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 112 Bankr. 191, 195 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989)
(claimant failed to satisfy necessary showing that its contribution was not duplicative); In
re Wonder Corp. of Am., 72 Bankr. 580, 585 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987) (successor counsel
performed valuable services with minimal duplication and avoided costly overlap).
166. The First Circuit recognized the efficiency of consulting and conferring with other
participants in the bankruptcy proceedings which avoids duplication of services between
the claimants. See In re Boston and Me. Corp., 62 Bankr. 199, 201 n.5 (D. Mass. 1986);
see also In re Meade Land and Dev. Co., 527 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1975) ("the estate
must not be depleted through a possible duplication of [services]"); In re Cascade Oil Co.,
Inc., 51 Bankr. 877, 881 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985) ("policy of economy in the administra-
tion of bankruptcy cases"). Nonduplication of services is still of concern in § 503 analy-
ses. See e.g., Sakowitz, Inc. v. Chase Bank Int'l (In re Sakowitz, Inc.), 110 Bankr. 268,
272 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) ("duplicative services may be taken into account in apprais-
ing the extent of value of the services reasonably necessary"); In re Wonder Corp. of
Am., 72 Bankr. 580, 585 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987) (commending valuable services with
minimal duplication); In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc., 54 Bankr. 504, 510
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (applicant "must actively participate in the reorganization process
in a manner which is not duplicative").
167. "Thus, Congress focused on the need for flexibility and speed and economy in
order to obtain optimum results in reorganization cases." 5 Collier, supra note 6, F1
1100.01, at 1100-14.
168. In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (citing
Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268 (1941)). Woods was decided
under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act and thus a more stringent standard was employed.
See Woods, 312 U.S. at 268. This has remained the standard under § 503. See. e.g.,
Pierson & Gaylen v. Creel & Atwood (In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc.), 785 F.2d
1249, 1257 (5th Cir. 1986) ("burden on the applicant to establish the value of his serv-
ices"); In re Packard Properties, Ltd., 118 Bankr. 61, 63 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (appli-
cant carries burden of proof throughout proceeding); In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, Inc.,
84 Bankr. 684, 689 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988) (burden on party making administrative
claim).
169. In re Meade Land and Dev. Co., 527 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1975); see also In re
Pacific Homes, 20 Bankr. 729, 737 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982) (court refusing to place mon-
etary value on the lives of 1,800 elderly persons).
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court "can reverse a fee award only if [it] find[s] the District Court
abused its discretion."' 170
Some courts have been reluctant to deny applicants recovery for their
services rendered and expenses incurred. One alternative has been to
deny reimbursement under Section 503(b), but then grant it on a contrac-
tual theory. "[E]ntitlement to reimbursement for expenses incurred and
services rendered under Code § 503(b)(3), (4) and (5) does not depend
on, and is independent of, any contractual entitlement to
reimbursement." 17
1
Despite these few areas of agreement, the absence of a uniform judicial
approach to an indenture trustee's application for reimbursement under
Section 503 results in highly uncertain outcomes. While one court might
engage in a liberal benefit analysis using its judicial discretion, another
court might reject an application based on the same factual circum-
stances if it decides that the indenture trustee did not confer a demon-
strable benefit on the entire estate. Courts define benefits differently,
exercise discretion differently and interpret similar facts differently.
Without a framework within which to analyze Section 503 applications,
confusion and inconsistent results will continue.
IV. PROPOSED GUIDELINES
All applications for reimbursement for services and expenses, regard-
less of the applicant's status, must be analyzed pursuant to Section
503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.172 In order to understand the unique
situation of indenture trustees, it is useful to distinguish between applica-
tions made by other applicants and those made by indenture trustees ful-
filling their prescribed duties pursuant to the Trust Indenture Act of
1939.
The interaction between the Bankruptcy Code and the Trust Indenture
Act is historic; Congress considered both the Trust Indenture Act and
the predecessors to the Bankruptcy Code at a time when the SEC Report
and its recommendations were available. 173 Trustees acting under the
"prudent-man" standard of the Trust Indenture Act must first and fore-
most protect debenture holders. 74 No other potential applicant under
170. Citibank, N.A. v. Multiponics, Inc. (In re Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 731, 733
(5th Cir. 1980).
171. In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 60 Bankr. 892, 895 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
172. The plain meaning of the text of § 503(b) identifies all potential applicants. See 11
U.S.C. § 503(b) (1988).
173. Part 6 of the SEC Report, entitled "Trustees Under Indentures," was submitted
to Congress in 1936 and therefore was available when Congress enacted both the Chan-
dler Act and the Trust Indenture Act. See also H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
5, 23 (1939) (implicitly acknowledging influence of Bankruptcy Act and any amendments
thereto on Trust Indenture Bill and also interaction between SEC Report and Trust In-
denture bill); supra notes 48 and 53 (discussing impact of SEC Report).
174. Statute requires that indenture trustees protect debenture holders. See 15 U.S.C.
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Section 503(b) has statutorily prescribed duties."'
If indenture trustees are to be compensated for their services and those
of their attorneys, they must contribute to the resolution of the bank-
ruptcy in the absence of any contractual provision to that effect.176 By
reviewing "substantial contribution" decisions, criteria can be assembled
on which to build a fair and legitimate framework for deciding whether
an indenture trustee's contribution justifies compensation.
* No distinction should be made between situations in which the in-
denture trustee confers a benefit on the entire estate and in which the
indenture trustee confers a benefit only on one party to the bankruptcy,
such as a creditor or a debenture holder. Any benefit conferred will aid
the larger process of reorganization. Thus, even in situations in which
the trustee provides a benefit to a party whose interests conflict with
those of the estate,'7 7 the indenture trustee should be reimbursed.
* The reorganization process is designed to be just and fair.'7 A pol-
icy geared toward awarding an estate more than it is rightfully entitled' 79
to defeats Congress' goal of justice and deprives other parties of their
rightful positions.180 The indenture trustee's actions, no matter whom
they benefit, advance the aims of the reorganization-to make the estate
viable and to put all parties to the bankruptcy in their rightful positions.
Thus, the presumption should be that indenture trustee expenses are ad-
ministrative priorities.
* Indenture trustees are required to act in accordance with the Trust
§§ 77aaa-77rrr (1988); see also supra note 12 (discussing requirements of §§ 77ii-77rrr of
Trust Indenture Act).
175. See supra notes 38 and 86.
176. Perhaps trust indentures should contain provisions providing reimbursement for
services and expenses and even attorneys' fees in the event of a bankruptcy proceeding.
177. Since the enactment of § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act in 1933, consummation of a
plan of reorganization has not been a precondition to reimbursement. See supra notes 33-
34 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Begier v. IRS, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2262 (1990) ("Equality of
distribution among creditors is a central policy of the Bankruptcy Code."); Bank of Ma-
rin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) ("There is an overriding consideration that equi-
table principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction."); lannotti v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (In re New York, N. H. & H. R.R.), 567 F.2d 166,
174 (2d Cir.) (" ' "the equitable is just" ' ") (quoting L. Hand, The Bill of Rights 21
(1962) (quoting Ethics, Book V, Chapter 10 fol. 1137, in IX The Works ofAristotle (W.D.
Ross trans. 1925))), cert denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 359 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 6315 ("The
bankruptcy court will remain a court of equity.. ."); see also CBL Report, supra note 44,
pt. 1, at 272 ("the goal of a successful reorganization is a fair plan").
179. "[T]he purpose of according priority in these cases is fulfillment of the equitable
principle of preventing unjust enrichment of the debtor's estate rather than the compen-
sation of the creditor for the loss to him." American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal
Corp. v. Leonardo Arrivabene, S.A., 280 F.2d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 1960).
180. "[Tlhe twin policy goals of. . . reorganization, [are] rehabilitation of a going
enterprise, and fair and equitable distribution to creditors." H.R. Rep. No. 686, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1975); see supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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Indenture Act's prudent-man standard."' 1 Applications by indenture
trustees for reimbursement for services rendered and expenses incurred
must also be analyzed in light of this criterion. If the application satisfies
the prudent-man standard, reimbursement should be awarded.
* The strict standard developed by certain courts allowing reimburse-
ment only for services that confer an actual, direct and demonstrable
benefit" 2 or tangible benefit 8 3 on the estate should be discarded as con-
trary to Section 503(b)'s legislative history and to the recommendations
of the SEC in its SEC Report.'8 Instead, conduct that enhances the
reorganization process should be compensable. 8 5
* Services that provide a benefit, whether direct, indirect or incidental,
should be compensable.' 6  Valuation of these services'8 7 should be
based on the cost of securing comparable services in the marketplace, the
applicant's normal fees for like services and recommendations from other
parties " involved in the reorganization.
* Finally, courts, employing their equity powers, should be en-
couraged to look beyond time and expense reports and grant or deny
applications based on their informed discretion 8 9 in light of the appli-
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (c) (1988); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text
(discussing Trust Indenture Act requirements to protect investors).
182. See supra notes 134-145 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
184. The Supreme Court granted compensation to those participants who rendered a
benefit to the estate; the Court required nothing more. See supra note 45 and accompany-
ing text; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text (SEC proposals that were to influ-
ence the Chandler Act).
185. By borrowing from both the actual-direct-and-demonstrable-benefit test, the tan-
gible-benefit test, and the foster-and-enhance-rather-than-retard-or-interrupt-the-reor-
ganization process test, a more consistent standard of conduct of assisting in the
reorganization-process with a minimum of duplication can be achieved. See supra notes
134-48, 152-60 and accompanying text. Conduct considered to enhance the reorganiza-
tion process might include objecting to the disposition of certain estate assets, negotiating
various agreements necessary for the estate to operate or to settle, investigating the rea-
sons for the debtor's collapse, assisting in trial preparation, attending creditor committee
meetings, or examining the debtor's affairs. The Bankruptcy Code is structured to en-
courage participation of creditors in the reorganization process. See, e.g., In re General
Oil Distrib., 51 Bankr. 794, 805 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985) (policy aimed at "promot[ing]
meaningful creditor participation"); In re Calumet Realty Co., 34 Bankr. 922, 926
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (encourage creditor action). "It is in this context that knowledge-
able creditors should take an active role in determining the course that the reorganization
case should take ... ." In re Automotive Nat'l Brands, Inc., 65 Bankr. 412, 414 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1986) (quoting Toy & Sports Warehouse, Inc., 38 Bankr. 646, 648 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
186. For example, one court ignored a rigorous benefit-to-the-estate test and based
reimbursement on the moral and legal nature of the obligation to the residents of a nurs-
ing home. See In re Pacific Homes, 20 Bankr. 729, 750 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982).
187. See supra note 74.
188. See, e.g., In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 Bankr. 246, 249 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1990) (testimony of disinterested party has proven decisive); In re Kaiser Steel
Corp., 74 Bankr. 885, 887 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (court considers objections to claim-
ant's application for reimbursement).




Currently, indenture trustees face little prospect of recouping their ex-
penses for services provided in a bankruptcy proceeding. As a result,
indenture trustees are unlikely to perform valuable services that, at the
very least, provide the estate with an incidental benefit. If this situation
continues, Congress will be faced with a situation similar to that which
existed at the time of the enactment of the Chandler Act in 1938. To-
day's allowance decisions discourage participation by those entities with
minor interests in bankrupt estates, a situation that the Chandler Act,
and later the Bankruptcy Code, was meant to cure.
Mark A. Cohen
1985). Court recognized the indenture trustee's contributions, which included develop-
ing consensual plan, assisting in compromise, and aiding in litigation strategies, as benefi-
cial and compensable based on its intense participation in the proceedings. See id.
Bankruptcy proceedings often last several years. During the duration of the case,
courts develop first-hand knowledge of the participants' contribution or lack thereof.
See eg., Iannotti v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (In re New York, N. H. & H.
R.R.), 567 F.2d 166, 168 (2d Cir.) (judge presided over case for nearly 16 years), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977); In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1376, 1381-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court has first-hand knowledge of applicants' work over seven years);
In re Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 18 Bankr. 834, 836 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court had
almost daily involvement for two years).
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